Triple pressure: How trade rebound, labor shortage and hub competition slow down Hong Kong’s port

Triple pressure: How trade rebound, labor shortage and hub competition slow down Hong Kong’s port
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At the end of 2025, the congestion dilemma at Hong Kong’s port has taken on the distinct characteristic of “multiple pressures overlapping and contradictions intensifying simultaneously.” The trade rebound triggered by the global economic recovery has overwhelmed the already saturated port facilities; the long-standing labor shortage has caused a “critical shortage of manpower” in port operations; and the fierce competition within the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area port cluster has further diverted cargo and exacerbated resource misallocation. These three factors act like three invisible hands, attacking from three sides: supply and demand, operational links, and the external environment. Together, they have dragged down the operational efficiency of Hong Kong’s port, trapping it in a vicious cycle of “soaring cargo flows with insufficient capacity, strong demand but lagging service.” A thorough analysis of the transmission paths and combined effects of these three factors is key to resolving the congestion plaguing Hong Kong’s port.
I. Trade Rebound: Unexpected Cargo Flow Overwhelms Saturated Facilities
The steady global economic recovery in 2025 has triggered a strong rebound in international trade. As a core hub connecting Asia-Pacific manufacturing hinterlands with global markets, Hong Kong’s port is the first to bear the impact of this surge in cargo flow. This unexpectedly strong trade rebound clashes sharply with the long-under-upgraded and saturated port facilities, becoming the immediate trigger for congestion.
The explosive growth in trade volume far exceeds the port’s carrying capacity. In 2025, China’s exports to major global economies grew by 18% year-on-year, with exports of electronics, textiles, machinery, and other products from the Pearl River Delta region being particularly strong, rising by 22% year-on-year. As a major outlet for foreign trade goods from the Pearl River Delta, Hong Kong’s port freight volume surged accordingly. During the traditional peak shipping season from November to December 2025, weekly container arrivals exceeded 1 million TEUs, far exceeding the port’s designed peak handling capacity (800,000 TEUs/week). Daily throughput frequently broke 150,000 TEUs, a 45% increase compared to the same period in 2024. This explosive growth was not gradual but presented a “pulse-like” impact. The peak cargo flow in the first week of December surged 60% compared to the November average, instantly paralyzing port facilities already at a critical state.
The rising proportion of high-value and special cargo increases operational complexity. The trade rebound is reflected not only in quantity but also in changes in cargo structure. In 2025, the proportion of high-value-added goods at Hong Kong’s port increased to 38%, with goods requiring special storage and rapid turnover, such as precision electronic components, medical equipment, and high-end consumer goods, growing by 25%. These types of cargo place higher demands on storage conditions, handling precision, and customs clearance efficiency, involve more complex operational processes, and take over 30% more time to handle per container compared to ordinary goods. Simultaneously, the demand for dangerous goods transportation surged, with dangerous goods container throughput at Hong Kong’s port increasing by 35% year-on-year in 2025. Dangerous goods transportation requires specialized berths, professional equipment, and strict inspections, further squeezing limited port resources and prolonging waiting times for ordinary cargo vessels.
Container supply-demand imbalance and empty container pile-ups exacerbate resource waste. The “shortage of containers” phenomenon caused by the trade rebound led to an export container shortage rate of 20%. Some shippers, in order to secure shipping space, moved empty containers to Hong Kong’s port for storage in advance, causing the proportion of empty containers to soar from the normal 25% to 40%. By the end of 2025, the empty container storage area at Kwai Tsing Container Terminal had increased by 28% compared to the same period last year. A large amount of prime storage space was occupied by empty containers, while urgently needed transshipment laden containers were squeezed into temporary storage areas, leading to a surge in re-handling rates. Data from Hong Kong International Terminals (HIT) shows that by the end of 2025, the average number of re-handles for laden containers reached 2.3 times, an increase of 1.1 times compared to 2024. The time spent per container re-handle extended to 45 minutes, directly causing a 30% drop in quay crane handling efficiency. This created a vicious cycle: “empty containers occupy space, laden containers have nowhere to go, and ships wait to unload.”
II. Labor Shortage: The “Manpower Shortage” Dilemma in Operations
If the trade rebound is the “external push” for congestion, then the labor shortage is the “internal blockage” in port operations. Affected by multiple factors such as an aging population, emigration waves, and declining industry attractiveness, the labor gap in Hong Kong’s port-related industries has long existed and intensified in 2025. From terminal handling and cross-border transportation to port services, multiple links are facing a “critical shortage of manpower,” directly slowing down port operational efficiency.
There is a severe shortage of frontline operational positions at terminals. Frontline positions at Hong Kong’s port, such as dockworkers, reach stacker drivers, and quay crane operators, have long faced labor shortages. As of October 2025, the gap for such positions reached 2,800 people, with a vacancy rate exceeding 20%. Due to the impact of the pandemic and emigration waves, Hong Kong’s labor force has decreased by nearly 220,000 people since 2019, with low-skilled laborers decreasing by about 160,000. Terminal frontline positions largely rely on this type of labor. To cope with the gap, some terminals have had to implement “two-shift” or even single extended-shift work patterns, leading to employee fatigue, decreased operational efficiency, and increased accident rates. By the end of 2025, the hourly handling rate per quay crane at Kwai Tsing Container Terminal was only around 30 moves, a 15% decrease from 2024, far below the level of over 40 moves at Singapore’s port.
The shortage of cross-border truck drivers exacerbates the collection and distribution bottleneck. As the core force for cargo transportation between Hong Kong’s port and the Pearl River Delta hinterland, the shortage of cross-border truck drivers is particularly acute. As of October 2025, the local Hong Kong truck driver shortage reached 3,000 people, with a vacancy rate exceeding 25%. Some trucking companies had an idle capacity rate of 15% due to lack of drivers. This gap stems from both the retirement wave of drivers due to Hong Kong’s aging population and the industry’s high work intensity coupled with declining salary attractiveness. Data from the Hong Kong Federation of Restaurants & Related Trades shows that salaries in service industries with similar intensity have increased by about 18% in recent years, while truck driver salaries have only increased by about 8%, leading some younger workers to shift to other industries. The driver shortage directly leads to low container pick-up efficiency. By the end of 2025, the average waiting time for trucks to enter the Kwai Tsing Container Terminal area exceeded 2 hours, with vehicle queues extending up to 5 kilometers at their longest. A large number of laden containers could not be evacuated promptly after unloading, exacerbating yard congestion.
Insufficient supply of professional technical and management talent. In addition to frontline operational positions, there is also a shortage of professional technical and management talent at Hong Kong’s port. As ports transition towards digitalization and intelligence, the demand for professionals in automated equipment maintenance, intelligent dispatching system operation, and supply chain management is increasing, but the local talent development system in Hong Kong has not kept up. In 2025, the gap for IT professionals and logistics management talent in Hong Kong’s port-related industries reached 1,200 people, leading to untimely maintenance of automated equipment and underutilization of intelligent dispatching systems. For example, due to a lack of professional maintenance personnel, the failure rate of automated quay cranes at Hong Kong’s port increased by 35% compared to 2024, with some equipment operating in a “faulty state” for extended periods, further reducing handling efficiency.
The foreign labor import scheme has limited effect in alleviating the shortage. To address the labor shortage, the Hong Kong SAR Government launched a foreign labor import scheme in 2023, planning to import 8,000 workers for the transport industry, with quotas of 900 and 800 for public minibus and coach drivers respectively. However, by the end of 2025, the actual implementation effect of this plan had not met expectations, with only about 4,000 foreign workers imported, mostly concentrated in positions like airport ground services. The import of foreign labor for core shortage positions such as truck drivers and dockworkers was less than 1,000. This is due to coordination issues regarding foreign workers’ salary and treatment compared to local standards, as well as factors like cumbersome visa procedures and language communication barriers, making it difficult for foreign labor imports to quickly fill the labor gap. The “manpower shortage” problem at the port is difficult to fundamentally alleviate in the short term.
III. Hub Competition: The “Diversion and Squeeze” from the Greater Bay Area Port Cluster
The rapid rise of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area port cluster has created a situation of “encirclement and squeeze” on Hong Kong’s port. Ports like Shenzhen’s Yantian Port and Guangzhou’s Nansha Port, relying on hardware advantages, cost advantages, and policy support, continuously divert cargo from Hong Kong’s port. The lack of regional coordination mechanisms further exacerbates resource misallocation and congestion pressure, becoming an important external factor slowing down Hong Kong’s port.
Hardware facility advantages create a “siphon effect.” Shenzhen’s Yantian Port and Guangzhou’s Nansha Port have continuously increased infrastructure investment in recent years, and their hardware conditions have comprehensively surpassed those of Hong Kong’s port. Yantian Port has an 18-meter deep water channel, allowing 24/7 access for ultra-large container ships, while Hong Kong’s port channel depth is only 17 meters, requiring some ultra-large vessels to wait for high tide; Yantian Port’s automation rate for quay cranes reaches 60%, with per-container handling efficiency 15%-20% higher than Hong Kong’s port, and logistics costs 20%-30% lower. These advantages have made Yantian Port the preferred port for US and Europe mainline services in South China. In 2024, its container throughput reached 33 million TEUs, with US and Europe routes accounting for over 50%, diverting a large amount of high-value-added cargo from Hong Kong. Guangzhou’s Nansha Port focuses on domestic trade and Southeast Asia routes leveraging its hinterland advantages. In 2024, its throughput exceeded 25 million TEUs, capturing nearly 15% of Hong Kong’s near-sea route market share. The gap in hardware facilities has gradually placed Hong Kong’s port at a disadvantage in competing for high-value-added, fast-turnover cargo.
Policy dividends and efficient hinterland connectivity capture market share. The policy benefits enjoyed by other ports in the Greater Bay Area and their efficient hinterland connections further squeeze the living space of Hong Kong’s port. Subsidy policies for “sea-rail intermodal transport” and “river-sea intermodal transport” introduced in Shenzhen and Guangzhou have significantly reduced cargo collection and distribution costs. In contrast, the logistics channels between Hong Kong’s port and inland cities in the Pearl River Delta still rely mainly on cross-border trucks, with the proportion of railway and waterway intermodal transport being only about 20%, far lower than the 45% in the Yangtze River Delta port cluster. Simultaneously, the continuous implementation of policies like “Northbound Travel for Hong Kong Vehicles” and “Northbound Travel for Macao Vehicles” allows some goods to be transported directly to the mainland via cross-border vehicles without transshipment through Hong Kong’s port. From January to April 2025, the cumulative clearance volume of Hong Kong and Macao single-plate vehicles exceeded 1,084,300 trips, a 31.16% increase year-on-year, further diverting transshipment cargo from Hong Kong’s port. Additionally, the “Smart Customs Clearance” system implemented by mainland customs has compressed clearance time to within 30 minutes, while the average clearance time at Hong Kong’s port remains 1.5 hours. The gap in policy and efficiency leads some shippers to “vote with their feet,” turning to other ports in the Greater Bay Area.
Homogeneous competition leads to resource misallocation and low efficiency. Hong Kong’s port and other ports in the Greater Bay Area have high overlap in route networks and cargo types, forming intense homogeneous competition. Hong Kong’s port has a transshipment trade share as high as 60%, while the transshipment trade shares of Yantian Port and Nansha Port are also increasing year by year, reaching 25% and 18% respectively in 2024, leading to fierce competition for similar cargo. This homogeneous competition not only leads to the loss of high-value-added cargo for Hong Kong’s port but also causes waste of regional port resources: each port invests heavily in building similar facilities, but due to cargo dispersion, they struggle to achieve economies of scale, leading to insufficient equipment utilization, while all face congestion pressure during peak periods. For example, when Hong Kong’s port anchorage was saturated at the end of 2025, vessels could not be promptly diverted to anchorages at Yantian Port or Nansha Port, leading to prolonged waiting times for berthing. Meanwhile, some berth and yard resources at Yantian Port and Nansha Port were idle, creating a resource misallocation pattern of “uneven busyness.”
IV. The Combined Effect of the Triple Pressure: The Vicious Cycle of Congestion
The three factors of trade rebound, labor shortage, and hub competition do not exist in isolation but are intertwined and amplify each other, forming a vicious cycle of “congestion — decreased efficiency — cargo diversion — insufficient revenue — upgrade lag — worsened congestion,” making the congestion dilemma at Hong Kong’s port increasingly severe.
The combination of trade rebound and labor shortage directly leads to the operational dilemma of “more cargo, fewer people.” The surge in cargo flow brought by the trade rebound requires more labor for handling, transportation, and clearance operations, but the labor shortage prevents port operational capacity from improving simultaneously. Ports can only cope by extending working hours and lowering service standards. This not only leads to longer vessel waiting times and increased cargo storage periods but also triggers more operational errors and disputes. By the end of 2025, cargo delays due to low operational efficiency accounted for 40% of cases, while problems like manifest errors and cargo mismatches caused by human error accounted for 18% of congestion causes. These issues further reduce shippers’ trust in Hong Kong’s port, prompting them to turn to other ports.
The combination of labor shortage and hub competition exacerbates the “decline in competitiveness” of Hong Kong’s port. Other ports in the Greater Bay Area, relying on sufficient labor supply (some ports alleviate gaps by importing mainland labor) and efficient operations, continuously divert cargo from Hong Kong’s port. The inefficiency caused by Hong Kong’s labor shortage further erodes its competitive advantage. The loss of high-value-added cargo leads to weak growth in Hong Kong’s port’s freight revenue. In 2025, the average per-container revenue at Hong Kong’s port was 12% lower than that at Yantian Port, making it difficult to invest sufficient funds in infrastructure upgrades and labor salary increases. This forms a vicious cycle: “insufficient revenue — inability to attract labor — low efficiency — further cargo diversion.”
The combination of trade rebound and hub competition leaves Hong Kong’s port “attacked from both front and rear.” The cargo flow growth brought by the trade rebound should have been an opportunity for port development. However, the competitive diversion from other Greater Bay Area ports prevents Hong Kong’s port from fully enjoying this红利. Instead, changes in cargo flow structure (increased proportion of low-value-added, slow-turnover goods) exacerbate congestion. For example, the proportion of cargo from emerging markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America increased from 25% to 40%. This type of cargo has a slower turnover speed, with an average berthing time 1.5 days longer than US and Europe routes, further dragging down port efficiency. Meanwhile, Yantian Port and Nansha Port have achieved a win-win in efficiency and profitability by focusing on fast-turnover US and Europe mainlines and Southeast Asia routes, forming a “dimensional reduction strike” against Hong Kong’s port.
V. The Path to Resolution: A Systemic Plan for Coordinatedly Addressing the Three Pressures
To escape the triple-pressure dilemma, Hong Kong’s port cannot merely adopt countermeasures against a single factor. It needs to construct a systemic plan to “address the trade rebound, alleviate the labor shortage, and optimize regional competition.” Through multiple means such as facility upgrades, policy innovation, and regional coordination, it must break the vicious cycle and rebuild core competitiveness.
(1) Addressing the Trade Rebound: Enhancing Facility Capacity and Operational Resilience
In the short term, optimize operational processes and resource allocation to enhance the port’s ability to cope with sudden cargo flows. Implement a “port arrival appointment” system to guide shippers and shipping companies to schedule cargo arrivals based on port capacity in different time slots, avoiding concentrated congestion. Optimize yard layout by transferring empty containers to backup yards to free up storage space in core areas, and control the storage density of laden containers within a reasonable range. Strengthen coordination with customs, maritime authorities, and other departments to open “green channels” for high-value-added and urgent cargo, implementing priority inspection and release to shorten clearance times.
In the long term, increase investment in infrastructure upgrades to break through capacity bottlenecks. Explore plans for “land reclamation” or “terminal upgrade and transformation” to add 1-2 deep-water berths, enhancing the ability to accommodate ultra-large vessels. Promote yard verticalization transformation, build smart automated storage and retrieval systems (AS/RS), increase storage height to 12 tiers, and increase storage capacity by 30% without occupying additional land. Upgrade channel facilities by further dredging the channel to 18 meters, enabling 24/7 berthing for ultra-large vessels and improving berthing efficiency.
(2) Alleviating the Labor Shortage: Replenishing the Manpower Gap Through Multiple Channels
Expand the scale of foreign labor import and optimize policy design. Learn from the successful experience of importing foreign labor in the construction and transport industries, expand the foreign labor import quota for port-related industries, focusing on positions with large gaps such as dockworkers and truck drivers. Simplify foreign labor visa procedures, introduce a “port industry special visa” to shorten approval cycles. Coordinate the formulation of reasonable salary standards to ensure foreign workers’ salaries align with local standards, while providing supporting services like accommodation and healthcare to increase their willingness to work.
Strengthen local labor training and attraction. Collaborate with local vocational institutions in Hong Kong to offer majors related to port operations and logistics management, providing targeted training for professional technical talent. Introduce industry incentive policies to improve salary packages for frontline terminal positions and truck drivers, establish performance-based reward mechanisms linked to operational efficiency, and enhance industry attractiveness. Encourage middle-aged and older individuals to participate in port work, learn from the Hong Kong government’s “Re-employment Allowance Pilot Scheme,” and provide subsidies to enterprises that hire middle-aged and older employees to fully utilize the existing labor force.
Promote automation and intelligent transformation to reduce reliance on manpower. Increase investment in automated equipment, raise the automation coverage rate of quay cranes to 50% and reach stackers to 40%, reducing demand for manual labor. Introduce AI-powered intelligent dispatching systems to achieve fully automated scheduling for vessel berthing, yard operations, and vehicle transportation, improving operational efficiency. Build a “smart port” platform to simplify operational processes through digital means, reduce manual intervention, and lower operational error rates.
(3) Optimizing Regional Competition: Building a Coordinated System for the Greater Bay Area Port Cluster
Clarify division of labor and positioning to achieve differentiated development. Leverage Hong Kong’s free port policy,完善的法律体系, and globally connected shipping network to focus on high-value-added international transshipment, air-sea intermodal transport, supply chain finance, and other businesses, building a “high-end shipping service center.” Divert some cargo such as US and Europe mainlines, domestic trade, and Southeast Asia routes to Yantian Port and Nansha Port, forming a differentiated division of labor pattern: “Hong Kong focuses on high-end services, Shenzhen focuses on mainline transportation, Guangzhou focuses on domestic trade and regional routes,” avoiding homogeneous competition.
Deepen the construction of regional coordination mechanisms to achieve resource sharing. Promote projects like the “Shenzhen-Hong Kong Combined Port” and “Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Logistics Channel” to achieve resource sharing, slot互认, and customs clearance mutual recognition among Greater Bay Area port cluster terminals. Establish an information-sharing platform to synchronize real-time information on each port’s storage capacity, berthing capability, freight rates, etc., guiding rational分流 of cargo flow. Achieve sharing of resources like anchorages and yards; when Hong Kong’s port anchorage is saturated, divert vessels to anchorages at Yantian Port and Nansha Port to avoid prolonged waiting.
Strengthen hinterland connectivity and expand cargo support. Increase the frequency of railway and waterway intermodal transport channels between Hong Kong and inland cities in the Pearl River Delta, promote “sea-rail intermodal” and “river-sea intermodal” models to improve collection and distribution efficiency and reduce reliance on cross-border trucks. Strengthen cooperation with inland economic zones like the Yangtze River Delta and Chengdu-Chongqing, open up “inland dry ports” to attract inland cargo for export via Hong Kong’s port, and expand the hinterland scope.
Conclusion
The “external shock” of trade rebound, the “internal blockage” of labor shortage, and the “external squeeze” of hub competition constitute the triple pressure slowing down Hong Kong’s port, also exposing the deep-seated shortcomings of Hong Kong’s port in facility capacity, operational management, and regional coordination. This congestion dilemma is both a challenge and an opportunity for transformation. As an international shipping center, the core advantage of Hong Kong’s port lies not merely in cargo throughput volume but in its free port policy, global shipping network, and high-end service capabilities, which are difficult for other Greater Bay Area ports to替代 in the short term.
To破解 the triple-pressure dilemma, Hong Kong’s port needs to跳出 the “single-point competition” mindset and promote deep-seated reforms with systemic thinking: address the pressure of trade rebound through facility upgrades, alleviate labor shortage through manpower replenishment and technological transformation, and optimize the competitive landscape through regional coordination. Only in this way can the vicious cycle be broken, allowing Hong Kong’s port to摆脱 the congestion dilemma and consolidate its status as an international shipping center. In the future, with the continuous improvement of the Greater Bay Area port cluster coordination mechanism, Hong Kong’s port will join forces with ports like Shenzhen and Guangzhou to build a more resilient global supply chain hub system, continue to play its role as a “trade bridge” connecting Asia-Pacific and the world, and provide solid support for the stable development of global trade.