Hong Kong Port Amid Year-End Cargo Peak: The Congestion Dilemma and Solutions

Every fourth quarter, global trade enters the traditional peak cargo season, with major Asian ports facing the test of a surge in shipment volumes. As an international shipping hub, Hong Kong Port once again fell into a congestion predicament at the end of 2025 — vessel berthing waiting times extended to 3-5 days, carriers on some routes were forced to skip ports, congestion surcharges for intra-Asia routes were reintroduced, and freight rates for dangerous goods soared to $25,000 per container. This phenomenon is not accidental but a concentrated outbreak of long-accumulated factors. Why does Hong Kong Port repeatedly suffer from congestion during the peak cargo season? Behind this dilemma lies not only the mismatch between infrastructure and market demand but also underlying contradictions in regional competition, supply chain transformation, and management mechanisms.

I. Infrastructure Capacity Nearing Limits, Physical Bottlenecks Hard to Break

The congestion issue at Hong Kong Port is first rooted in the inherent constraints and lagging development of its infrastructure. As one of the world’s busiest container ports, Hong Kong’s Kwai Tsing Container Terminals serve as the core hub, boasting 9 terminals, 24 berths, a deep-water coastline totaling 7,794 meters, and a designed annual handling capacity exceeding 20 million TEUs. However, this capacity has approached saturation under the dual pressures of recent trade recovery and concentrated cargo surges.

Data shows that Hong Kong Port’s container throughput reached 42 million TEUs in 2023, a year-on-year increase of 8.2%. Although the throughput slightly declined to 13.7 million TEUs in 2024 (due to statistical differences), the daily throughput during the year-end peak season frequently exceeded 150,000 TEUs, far exceeding the terminal’s optimal daily handling threshold. More critically, the room for infrastructure expansion is limited: there is no available land for development around the Kwai Tsing Basin. While the channel deepening project to 17 meters was completed in 2016, it still cannot meet the regular berthing needs of next-generation ultra-large container ships (with a capacity exceeding 20,000 TEUs). The update rate of terminal loading and unloading equipment is equally lagging — the coverage rate of automated quay cranes is less than 30%, significantly lower than Singapore Port’s 70% and Shanghai Port’s 55%, resulting in a 15%-20% lower container handling efficiency compared to competitors.

Insufficient yard capacity further exacerbates congestion. Hong Kong Port’s total yard area is approximately 279 hectares. Based on current throughput, the yard utilization rate has long remained above 90%, and even nears saturation during the year-end peak season. Delays in container pickups have led to a sharp increase in storage pressure, with some goods forced to occupy temporary storage areas, even affecting vessel berthing operations. According to data from FIBS Logistics, the average container storage time at Hong Kong Port extended to 4.2 days at the end of 2025, an increase of 1.8 days compared to normal periods, directly dragging down terminal turnover efficiency.

The supporting shortcomings of mid-stream operation areas cannot be ignored either. As an important supplement to Hong Kong Port, mid-stream operation areas handle approximately 3.3 million TEUs annually. However, with a 3,310-meter embankment length and 33-hectare area, they struggle to accommodate sudden cargo surges during peak seasons. In the first week of December 2025, affected by concentrated shipments from manufacturing industries in the Pearl River Delta, the maximum waiting time for vessels at mid-stream operation areas reached 36 hours. Some inland river ships were unable to unload in a timely manner, indirectly causing disruptions in barge transfer connections at Kwai Tsing Terminals.

II. Fierce Regional Port Competition, Insufficient Cargo Diversion and Coordination

Hong Kong Port’s congestion dilemma is closely linked to the competitive landscape of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) port cluster. With the rapid rise of ports such as Shenzhen Yantian and Guangzhou Nansha, Hong Kong’s traditional advantages are gradually eroding. The lack of regional coordination mechanisms has further amplified the congestion effect during peak seasons.

In terms of competitiveness, Shenzhen Yantian Port has become the preferred port for Europe-US routes in South China, thanks to its deeper channel (18 meters), higher automation level (60% coverage of automated quay cranes), and lower logistics costs (20%-30% cheaper than Hong Kong). In 2024, Yantian Port’s container throughput reached 33 million TEUs, with Europe-US routes accounting for over 50%, while Hong Kong’s share of similar routes has dropped to 35%. Leveraging its hinterland advantages in the GBA, Guangzhou Nansha Port focuses on domestic trade and Southeast Asia routes. Its throughput exceeded 25 million TEUs in 2024, diverting nearly 15% of Hong Kong’s short-sea route cargo.

Homogeneous competition among regional ports has put Hong Kong Port in a “dilemma”: on one hand, high-value-added Europe-US route cargo is diverted to Yantian Port, forcing Hong Kong to shift to lower-profit transshipment trade and short-sea routes; on the other hand, the increased proportion of transshipment trade (reaching 60%) has added more cargo transfer links and extended logistics cycles. For example, goods shipped from Chongqing and Chengdu to Africa, Asia, and Latin America need to be transported by inland river ships to Shenzhen, then transferred to Hong Kong by barge, and finally loaded onto ocean-going vessels. The entire process involves more than 3 transfers, and delays in any link can lead to port backlogs.

More importantly, the coordination mechanism of the GBA port cluster is not yet improved. Although Hong Kong has signed multiple cooperation agreements with Shenzhen and Guangzhou, progress in core areas such as route division, information sharing, and customs clearance integration has been slow. Hong Kong’s Port Community System (PCS) has been launched but has not yet achieved seamless connection with the logistics information platforms of mainland ports, resulting in information barriers in cargo tracking, manifest transmission, and other links. During the peak season at the end of 2025, issues such as manifest errors and cargo mismatches caused by information asymmetry accounted for 18% of Hong Kong Port’s congestion factors, directly affecting vessel turnover efficiency.

III. Superimposed Supply Chain Fluctuations and External Factors, Concentrated Release of Congestion Risks

Congestion during the year-end cargo peak is essentially a concentrated reflection of fluctuations in various links of the supply chain. From the cargo source to the transportation end, from natural factors to policy changes, the superposition of multiple external variables has further amplified the operational pressure on Hong Kong Port.

The concentrated outbreak of cargo is a direct trigger. Every November to December, to meet delivery deadlines before Christmas and the Spring Festival, manufacturing industries in the Pearl River Delta (such as electronics, toys, and clothing) release shipments in bulk, leading to a 30%-40% month-on-month increase in Hong Kong Port’s cargo volume. In 2025, driven by global economic recovery expectations, this growth rate reached 45%, with weekly container arrivals exceeding 1 million TEUs — far exceeding the port’s designed peak handling capacity of 800,000 TEUs per week. At the same time, the imbalance between container supply and demand has exacerbated congestion: the shortage rate of export containers during the peak season reached 20%. To secure shipping space, some shippers transported empty containers to the port in advance for storage, further occupying limited yard resources.

Poor connection in the logistics chain has formed a “bottleneck”. Hong Kong Port’s cargo transfer relies heavily on cross-border truck transportation, with approximately 70% of containers transported by road to the Pearl River Delta hinterland. However, the transportation capacity of cross-border trucks is restricted by customs clearance efficiency and road capacity. During the peak season at the end of 2025, the length of truck queues around Kwai Chung Container Terminals reached a maximum of 5 kilometers, with the average waiting time for trucks to enter the terminal exceeding 2 hours. In addition, the shortage of local truck drivers in Hong Kong is becoming increasingly severe. As of October 2025, the driver shortage reached 3,000, resulting in delayed pickup of some containers after unloading, further increasing yard pressure.

The impact of natural factors and emergencies cannot be ignored. Located in a typhoon-prone area, Hong Kong Port may suspend operations due to typhoons from July to December each year. In November 2025, Typhoon “Coral” hit Hong Kong, closing the port for 36 hours and causing a backlog of 40,000 TEUs. During the subsequent resumption of operations, the surge in daily handling volume directly triggered a week-long congestion. Beyond typhoons, extreme weather such as heavy fog and rain frequently disrupts port operations. In the first week of December 2025, delays in vessel arrivals caused by heavy fog accounted for 12%.

Policy changes and trade environment impacts are equally profound. Adjustments in the global trade pattern have altered the cargo flow direction of Hong Kong Port. In recent years, the proportion of cargo from emerging markets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has increased from 25% to 40%. However, the vessel scheduling efficiency of these routes is relatively low, with an average berthing time 1.5 days longer than that of Europe-US routes. Meanwhile, adjustments in customs inspection policies have affected clearance efficiency. In 2025, Hong Kong Customs strengthened inspections on dangerous goods and high-value cargo, increasing the inspection ratio from 5% to 8%. While ensuring trade security, this has extended the clearance time for some goods to 36 hours.

IV. Breaking the Dilemma: Infrastructure Upgrading, Regional Coordination, and Digital Transformation

To escape the “year-end congestion” predicament, Hong Kong Port needs to make systematic efforts from three dimensions: short-term mitigation, medium-term optimization, and long-term transformation. It should reconstruct port competitiveness through measures such as infrastructure upgrading, deepened regional coordination, and accelerated digital transformation.

In the short term, the focus should be on emergency mitigation during peak seasons. On one hand, optimize terminal operation processes, implement a “24/7 uninterrupted operation” model, increase the efficiency of loading and unloading equipment during peak seasons, and reduce the per-container handling time from 3 minutes to 2.5 minutes. On the other hand, strengthen traffic management, expand the container truck buffer zone, and implement an “appointment-based container pickup” system to reduce congestion around terminals. The Hong Kong Police Force and the Transport Department can learn from the successful experience of the “ticketing system” implemented after the 2002 typhoon, improving cross-border transportation efficiency through phased release and dynamic regulation. Meanwhile, accelerate the implementation of the Port Community System (PCS) to achieve real-time information sharing among shipping companies, terminals, customs, and shippers, and digitize processes such as manifest declaration and customs clearance to shorten cargo clearance time.

In the medium term, it is necessary to deepen regional coordination and resource integration. Hong Kong should proactively integrate into the development of the GBA port cluster and establish clear route division with ports such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou: Hong Kong can focus on high-value-added international transshipment and air-sea intermodal transportation, Yantian Port on Europe-US trunk routes, and Nansha Port on domestic trade and Southeast Asia routes, forming a pattern of “complementary advantages and differentiated development”. Specifically, promote the upgrading of the “Shenzhen-Hong Kong Combined Port” model to achieve shared terminal resources and slot recognition between the two ports, reducing cargo transfer links. At the same time, co-construct cross-border logistics channels, increase barge routes between Hong Kong and inland cities in the Pearl River Delta, and divert some cargo to ports such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou for loading and unloading to ease pressure on Hong Kong Port. In addition, Hong Kong should accelerate the revision of transshipment trade-related regulations, extending the exemption policy for air-transshipped goods to multi-modal transportation such as sea-air and land-air transshipment, improving transshipment efficiency.

In the long term, the core lies in infrastructure upgrading and digital, green transformation. In terms of infrastructure, Hong Kong needs to break through land resource constraints, explore “reclamation” or “terminal upgrading and renovation” plans, add 1-2 deep-water berths, and increase the annual handling capacity to over 25 million TEUs. Meanwhile, increase investment in automated equipment, raise the coverage rate of automated quay cranes to 50%, and introduce AI intelligent scheduling systems to optimize yard layout and vessel berthing sequences, improving overall operational efficiency. For digital transformation, fully apply technologies such as blockchain and the Internet of Things (IoT) to build a “smart port” ecosystem: use blockchain to achieve cargo traceability and immutable information, reducing inspection costs; leverage IoT devices to real-time monitor container location, temperature, and humidity, enhancing cargo transportation safety; use big data analytics to predict cargo peaks and allocate resources in advance. Green transformation is equally crucial: expand the application of electric container trucks, achieve full electrification of short-distance transportation within the port area by 2030; promote the “carbon-neutral shipping” plan, build green fuel bunkering facilities, attract eco-friendly vessels to berth, and enhance the port’s sustainable competitiveness.

Furthermore, policy support and industry coordination are indispensable. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government should continue its “proactive” role, increase investment in port infrastructure, optimize tax incentives for the shipping industry, and attract more ship registrations and shipping companies to settle. Meanwhile, strengthen cooperation with international ports, expand emerging businesses such as green fuel bunkering and ship financing, and create diversified revenue streams. At the industry level, shipping companies, terminal operators, and shippers should establish long-term cooperation mechanisms, stabilize cargo flow rhythms through signing “long-term shipping agreements” and “flexible slot contracts”, and avoid congestion caused by concentrated shipments during peak seasons.

Conclusion

The year-end congestion at Hong Kong Port is the result of intertwined factors such as insufficient infrastructure capacity, intensified regional competition, and supply chain fluctuations. It not only exposes the transformation pains of traditional shipping hubs amid global changes but also highlights the urgency of coordinated development of the GBA port cluster. As an international shipping center, Hong Kong Port’s core advantages lie in its free port policy, sound legal system, and globally accessible shipping network — advantages that ports like Shenzhen and Guangzhou cannot replace in the short term.

In the future, Hong Kong Port needs to break through the dilemma with a “breakthrough” mindset: lay a solid hardware foundation through infrastructure upgrading, release cluster effects through regional coordination and integration, improve operational efficiency through digital transformation, and seize future opportunities through green development. Only in this way can it maintain a leading position in global port competition, truly play the core role of an international shipping hub in the GBA, and ensure that “congestion” no longer becomes a keyword during the year-end cargo peak.