由 lltx1822 Competitiveness Alarm: Will Persistent Congestion Undermine Hong Kong’s Status as an International Shipping Center?
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As the world’s fourth-largest international shipping center, the foundation of Hong Kong’s status rests on the triple advantages of an “efficient hub, free port policy, and global network.” There was a time when average vessel berthing wait times were under one day, transshipment trade efficiency led the world, and shipping finance and maritime arbitration services extended across the Asia-Pacific. But now, persistent 3-5 day vessel port delays, doubled storage fees, and continuously declining cargo flows prompt the market to ask a fundamental question: Is this protracted congestion merely short-term pain, or will it fundamentally shake the core status of Hong Kong’s international shipping center? The answer is not black and white: Congestion itself will not directly overturn its position. However, if left unchecked, the vicious cycle of “cargo diversion, industry relocation, functional weakening, and declining competitiveness” triggered by congestion will gradually erode the core strengths of Hong Kong’s shipping industry, reducing it from a “leader” to a “follower” in the global shipping landscape.
I. Cargo Diversion: Loss of Core Business, Loosening the Foundation of Hub Throughput
One of the core indicators of an international shipping center is stable and substantial cargo throughput. Persistent congestion is becoming a “catalyst” for cargo diversion, causing Hong Kong’s port’s core business to continuously shift to more efficient neighboring ports, shaking its throughput foundation.
(I) Continuous Loss of Direct Cargo, Weakening Transshipment Advantage
In Hong Kong’s port cargo flow structure, transshipment cargo accounts for about 60%, and direct loading/unloading cargo for about 40%. However, persistent congestion has led to a significant diversion of direct cargo flow to Shenzhen’s Yantian Port and Guangzhou’s Nansha Port. Data shows that among the direct import and export cargo of members of the Hong Kong Container Terminal Operators Association, three-quarters are now handled by Shenzhen Port, with only one-third transported via Hong Kong’s port. More alarmingly, signs of transshipment cargo diversion are emerging. In 2025, Yantian Port’s US and Europe mainline cargo flow increased by 12% year-on-year, while Hong Kong’s port saw a 3% decline. Some Southeast Asian cargo originally transshipped via Hong Kong now opts for “one-stop” transshipment at Yantian Port, because congestion at Hong Kong’s port extended the transshipment cycle from 3 to 7 days, increasing logistics costs by over 20%.
The weakening of transshipment advantage stems from the direct impact of efficiency shortcomings. The average vessel berthing wait time at Hong Kong’s port is 3-5 days, while Shenzhen’s Yantian Port, through automation upgrades, has compressed vessel wait times to under 12 hours, with per-container handling efficiency 15%-20% higher than Hong Kong’s. For high-value-added cargo prioritizing “timeliness,” this efficiency gap is enough to prompt a port shift. For example, imported components for Pearl River Delta electronics companies, previously 80% transshipped via Hong Kong, now see 40% shifted to Yantian Port, solely because the latter can shorten the delivery cycle from 45 to 30 days, avoiding production line shutdown risks.
(II) Outflow of Empty Container Resources, Storage Function Being Replaced
Empty container scheduling efficiency is a key metric for measuring a port’s hub function. However, 40% of Hong Kong’s port yard space is occupied by empty containers, leading to a surge in laden container storage pressure and further exacerbating congestion. To alleviate this, a large number of empty containers are forced to be diverted for storage at Shenzhen and Guangzhou ports. Through the “Greater Bay Area Empty Container Sharing Platform,” over 20% of Hong Kong’s empty containers have been transferred to Yantian and Nansha Ports. While this releases storage space in the short term, in the long run, it means the empty container scheduling and storage functions of Hong Kong’s port are being gradually replaced.
More seriously, empty container diversion has triggered “path dependency.” Export enterprises at Pearl River Delta inland ports increasingly prefer to pick up empty containers directly from Yantian or Nansha Ports rather than transshipping via Hong Kong. This further reduces the empty container turnover efficiency of Hong Kong’s port, forming a vicious cycle of “empty container diversion, laden container storage pressure, worsened congestion, more empty container diversion.” The Chairman of the Hong Kong Container Terminal Operators Association frankly stated that if Hong Kong’s terminals fail to improve efficiency, they risk further losing transshipment cargo, even facing the risk of the “hollowing out” of the empty container yard.
(III) High-Value-Added Cargo Flow Shifts, Continuous Decline in Business Quality
High-value-added cargo (e.g., precision electronics, medical equipment, high-end consumer goods) have extremely high requirements for timeliness and stability, and are also the core profit source for Hong Kong’s port. However, persistent congestion has caused accelerated diversion of such cargo flow. In 2025, Hong Kong’s cross-border e-commerce consolidation business volume decreased by 8% year-on-year, with some enterprises moving to Shenzhen’s Qianhai. The proportion of high-end electronics manufacturing exports from the Pearl River Delta passing through Hong Kong’s port dropped from 55% in 2020 to 38% in 2025, with the remainder shifting to Yantian Port and Guangzhou Port.
Behind the cargo flow shift lie dual considerations of cost and risk. A Dongguan electronics company revealed that for products exported via Hong Kong’s port, the increase in logistics costs due to congestion accounts for about 3%-5% of the final sales price, and order default risk rises by 15%. To mitigate risk, it had to shift the logistics channels for some high-end orders to Yantian Port. This trend of “loss of high-quality cargo flow, retention of low-value-added cargo flow” will lead to a continuous decline in the business quality of Hong Kong’s port, further weakening its profitability.
II. Industry Relocation: Loosening of the Shipping Ecosystem Chain, Gradual Weakening of Core Functions
The status of Hong Kong’s international shipping center relies not only on port handling and transshipment functions but also on a complete ecosystem chain of “port, shipping services, and financial support.” The industrial cluster formed by shipping company regional headquarters, marine insurance institutions, ship leasing companies, maritime arbitration bodies, etc., constitutes its core competitiveness distinct from neighboring ports. However, persistent congestion is causing this ecosystem chain to loosen, with core industries showing signs of relocation.
(I) Relocation of Shipping Company Regional Headquarters, Weakening of Decision-Making Functions
The efficiency decline and cost increases caused by congestion have already prompted some shipping companies to relocate their regional headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore and Shanghai. From 2024-2025, employment in Hong Kong’s shipping services sector decreased by approximately 2%, and the scale of shipping finance business declined by 5%. Several leading shipping companies moved their Asia-Pacific operational centers from Hong Kong to Singapore, citing Singapore Port’s fully automated operations ensuring route stability and the digital coordination efficiency of its PortNet system far exceeding Hong Kong’s current level.
More seriously, the decision-making functions of shipping enterprises are gradually weakening. Core business activities originally completed in Hong Kong, such as route planning, capacity allocation, and customer service, are partially transferred to branches in Shenzhen and Guangzhou due to the need for close对接 with port operations. Hong Kong retains only back-office functions like financial settlement and legal compliance, degrading from an “operational decision-making center” to a “back-office support center.” This functional downgrade will further weaken the industrial agglomeration effect of Hong Kong’s shipping industry.
(II) Loss of Maritime Service Industry, Erosion of Upstream Value Chain Advantage
Hong Kong is the world’s second-largest center for marine protection and indemnity insurance and one of the world’s top four international maritime arbitration centers. Maritime services are the core link in its shipping industry value chain. However, persistent port congestion has led to a loss of some maritime service business. Marine insurance firms increasingly prefer to tie their products to efficient ports, offering customized insurance for routes using Yantian and Nansha Ports. Among maritime arbitration cases, the proportion involving disputes related to Hong Kong’s port dropped from 35% in 2020 to 28% in 2025, with some cases opting for arbitration in Singapore or London.
The loss of the maritime service industry stems from the drag of port operational efficiency. Marine insurance premiums are directly linked to port congestion risk. Congestion at Hong Kong’s port caused related route insurance premiums to rise by 10%-15%, weakening the price competitiveness of Hong Kong’s marine insurance. The decrease in maritime arbitration cases is because disputes arising from port congestion often involve demurrage and违约赔偿, and parties prefer arbitration institutions closer to the port of loading or discharge to reduce维权 costs. If this trend continues, it will erode Hong Kong’s advantageous position in the upstream shipping value chain.
(III) Relocation of Supporting Logistics Industries, Fracturing of Service Ecosystem Chain
Port congestion also causes supporting industries like logistics warehousing, cross-border e-commerce consolidation, and ship repair to relocate. In 2025, Hong Kong’s cross-border e-commerce consolidation business volume decreased by 8% year-on-year, with some enterprises moving to Shenzhen’s Qianhai, citing more advanced logistics facilities, higher clearance efficiency, and the ability to achieve “seamless connection” with Yantian Port. Ship repair companies, due to berth congestion at Hong Kong’s port, saw repair appointment cycles extend from 7 to 15 days, leading to some business loss to Guangzhou’s Nansha Port and Zhuhai’s Gaolan Port.
The relocation of supporting industries causes Hong Kong’s shipping ecosystem chain to fracture. The port is no longer the core hub of an industrial cluster but becomes an isolated handling node. The synergistic effect of the original “port – logistics – service – finance” collaboration ceases to exist. This fracturing of the ecosystem chain will degrade the function of Hong Kong’s international shipping center from a “comprehensive service hub” to a “single handling port,” with its differentiated advantages compared to neighboring ports gradually disappearing.
III. Functional Weakening: Blurred Hub Positioning, Declining Global Competitive Advantage
Competition among global international shipping centers is, in essence, comprehensive competition in “efficiency, function, and ecosystem.” Hong Kong originally held a core position in the Asia-Pacific shipping landscape with the combined advantages of an “efficient hub, free port policy, and global network.” However, persistent congestion has led to a blurring of its functional positioning, with its advantages continuously declining in competition with global shipping centers like Singapore, Shanghai, and Dubai.
(I) Widening Gap with Singapore Port, Complete Defeat in Efficiency Competition
Singapore Port is Hong Kong’s most direct competitor, both focusing on transshipment trade and high-end shipping services. However, persistent congestion has caused the gap between Hong Kong and Singapore Port to持续拉大. Singapore Port’s automated terminal coverage reaches 100%, with quay crane hourly handling rates of 45 moves and average vessel berthing wait times under 12 hours. In contrast, Hong Kong’s port has less than 30% automated quay crane coverage, quay crane hourly handling rates of only 30 moves, and average vessel berthing wait times of 3-5 days.
The efficiency gap directly translates into competitive disadvantage. In 2025, Singapore Port’s container throughput increased by 5% year-on-year, while Hong Kong’s port declined by 3%. In shipping finance, Singapore’s ship leasing business scale has surpassed Hong Kong’s, becoming the largest ship leasing center in Asia-Pacific. In maritime arbitration, the number of cross-border maritime dispute cases accepted by Singapore has surpassed Hong Kong, making it the world’s second-largest maritime arbitration center. This all-around competitive disadvantage is gradually weakening Hong Kong’s voice in the global shipping landscape.
(II) Facing “Front and Rear Pincer Attack” from Shanghai and Shenzhen Ports, Functions Being Diverted
In the domestic market, Hong Kong’s port faces a “front and rear pincer attack” from Shanghai and Shenzhen ports. Shanghai Port, leveraging the hinterland advantage of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, has gradually developed into the world’s largest container port, with its shipping finance and ship交易业务规模 continuously expanding, diverting Hong Kong’s northern cargo flow and high-end shipping services. Shenzhen Port,凭借 its区位 advantage adjacent to the Pearl River Delta manufacturing base and efficiency advantages from automation and digitization, diverts Hong Kong’s southern China cargo flow and direct loading business.
More alarmingly, Shenzhen and Shanghai ports are gradually transitioning towards “comprehensive shipping centers,”侵蚀 Hong Kong’s core functions. Shenzhen’s Qianhai has established a cross-border e-commerce consolidation center and a ship leasing agglomeration area,推出 maritime legal services aligned with Hong Kong. The Lingang New Area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone focuses on developing shipping finance and bulk commodity trading logistics, building a shipping ecosystem complementary to Hong Kong’s. This “pincer attack”态势 will lead to further diversion of Hong Kong’s port functions, with the positioning of an international shipping center becoming increasingly模糊.
(III) Free Port Policy Advantage Diluted, Uniqueness Gradually Lost
One of the core advantages of Hong Kong’s international shipping center is its free port policy: zero tariffs, low tax rates, and simplified clearance procedures. However, as the openness of mainland ports continuously increases, this advantage is being gradually diluted. Shenzhen’s Yantian Port and Guangzhou’s Nansha Port have both implemented a supervision model of “first-tier放开, second-tier管住,” significantly improving clearance efficiency. The Lingang New Area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone推出 tax incentive policies for shipping-related businesses, with tax rates for ship leasing and shipping insurance gradually converging with Hong Kong’s.
Persistent congestion further weakens the attractiveness of the free port policy. Enterprises choose Hong Kong’s port essentially to enjoy the combined红利 of “free port policy and efficient operation.” But now the红利 of “efficient operation” has disappeared. Relying solely on the free port policy is already难以留住 cargo flow and industries. A foreign trade enterprise直言: “If it’s just policy incentives without efficiency guarantees, we would rather choose the more efficient Yantian Port. Even with slightly fewer policy incentives, we can avoid default risks caused by congestion.”
IV. The Path to Resolution: Reconstructing Competitiveness, Consolidating International Shipping Center Status
Persistent congestion is indeed shaking Hong Kong’s status as an international shipping center, but this is not irreversible. Hong Kong still possesses core assets like the “One Country, Two Systems” institutional advantage, free port policy, global shipping network, and high-end professional services. As long as it can address the root causes through systematic reform of “efficiency reconstruction, functional upgrade, synergy deepening, and ecosystem reshaping,” it can transform the “crisis” of congestion into an “opportunity” for transformation, consolidating its international shipping center status.
(I) Efficiency Reconstruction: Using Technology Empowerment to Break Congestion, Rebuilding Efficient Hub Advantage
Efficiency is the lifeline of an international shipping center. Hong Kong must accelerate efficiency reconstruction centered on digitization and automation to solve the congestion problem. In the short term, it should accelerate port automation transformation, increasing the automated quay crane coverage rate at existing terminals from less than 30% to 50%, introducing unmanned container trucks and intelligent yard systems, compressing per-container handling time from 3 minutes to 2 minutes, and shortening the average vessel berthing wait time to under 1 day. Simultaneously, fully implement and upgrade the “Port Community System” (PCS), completing its construction in 2025 to achieve digital coordination for processes like vessel berthing applications, customs declaration/inspection, and yard scheduling, compressing clearance time from 1.5 hours to within 30 minutes.
In the medium term, it should advance the vertical development and back-up land reorganization of the Kwai Tsing Container Terminal, converting excess parking and waiting areas into container yards, integrating existing pontoon berths and adding 3 new pontoon berths, expected to increase handling capacity by 3 to 4 million TEUs. In the long term, it should accelerate the advancement of the Hong Kong West Port Project. Through land reclamation, add 300 hectares of yard area and 30 deep-water berths to彻底解决 the problem of insufficient physical space, enabling Hong Kong’s port’s total handling capacity to突破 90 million TEUs.
(II) Functional Upgrade: From “Handling Hub” to “Core of High-End Shipping Ecosystem”
To consolidate its international shipping center status, Hong Kong must跳出 the mindset of “measuring英雄 by throughput” and推动 functional upgrade, transforming from a “handling hub” to the “core of a high-end shipping ecosystem.” Focus on developing three high-value-added functions. First, high-end shipping services. Expand the scale of businesses like ship leasing, shipping insurance, and supply chain finance. Optimize tax incentive policies to attract domestic and international shipping finance enterprises. Aim to突破 a shipping finance market size of HKD 500 billion in Hong Kong before 2030. Second, maritime legal services. Leveraging Hong Kong’s mature legal system, build an Asia-Pacific maritime arbitration center, attract cross-border maritime dispute cases for arbitration in Hong Kong, and提升 its voice in global shipping rule-making. Third, green shipping hub. Accelerate the construction of a green marine fuel bunkering center, publish the “Action Plan on Green Marine Fuel Bunkering” by the end of 2025, and achieve a 50% proportion of green vessel berthing by 2030, becoming an important green shipping hub in the Asia-Pacific region.
Simultaneously, focus on high-value-added logistics business. Provide integrated services like bonded warehousing, precise distribution, and after-sales maintenance for high-end manufacturing industries like electronics and medical equipment in the Pearl River Delta. Utilize high-end logistics facilities in the Northern Metropolis to build cross-border e-commerce consolidation centers and bulk commodity delivery centers, constructing an industrial ecosystem of “high-end logistics, shipping services, and financial support.”
(III) Synergy Deepening: Integrate into the Greater Bay Area, Build the Combined Strength of the “Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangzhou” Port Cluster
The development of Hong Kong’s shipping离不开 the support of the Greater Bay Area. It must deepen synergy with Shenzhen and Guangzhou ports, building the combined strength of a port cluster with “Hong Kong services, Shenzhen efficiency, and Guangzhou hinterland” to achieve complementary advantages and risk sharing. In the short term, improve the “Greater Bay Area Port Resource Coordination Platform,” diverting 20% of Hong Kong’s port’s empty containers for storage at Shenzhen and Guangzhou ports, and 30% of US and Europe mainline cargo flow to berth at Yantian Port, alleviating Hong Kong’s storage and berth pressure. Promote the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Dapeng Bay model of “one-time pilotage, one-time fee” across the entire Pearl River Estuary, achieving “one declaration, one inspection, one release,” reducing process losses in cross-border logistics.
In the medium term, accelerate the construction of cross-border collection and distribution channels, improve cross-river channels like the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Western Railway and the Lion’s Gate Bridge, increasing the proportion of “sea-rail intermodal” transport between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta hinterland from 20% to 40%. Increase the frequency of express barge services from Hong Kong to Yantian and Nansha Ports, implementing “fixed departure times, priority berthing,” compressing cross-port transfer time to within 2 hours. In the long term, build a transport system of “Hong Kong hub, Bay Area feeders, Southeast Asia network.” Hong Kong focuses on international transshipment and high-end services, while Shenzhen and Guangzhou specialize in mainline transportation and hinterland辐射, forming a synergistic effect where “1+1+1>3.”
(IV) Ecosystem Reshaping:完善 Institutional Safeguards, Build a Sustainable Development Environment
The implementation of functional upgrades and synergy deepening离不开完善的 institutional safeguards. Hong Kong should reshape its shipping ecosystem from three dimensions: mechanism, policy, and talent. First, mechanism innovation. Reform the existing “Hong Kong Maritime and Port Board” into the “Hong Kong Maritime and Port Development Bureau” as a high-level advisory body to coordinate and advance port development planning, policy formulation, and industry coordination, building a bridge for government-industry communication. Second, policy support. Introduce a “Hong Kong Port Long-Term Development Support Policy Package,” providing tax reductions and funding subsidies for areas like shipping finance, green shipping, and smart port construction. Establish a HKD 50 billion Port Development Fund to support infrastructure upgrades and technological innovation. Third, talent cultivation. Collaborate with the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University to offer majors in shipping management, smart ports, etc., for targeted training of high-end talent in automated operations, shipping finance, supply chain management, etc. Simultaneously, launch a “Maritime Talent Program,” offering high salaries to recruit global shipping experts to solve the talent shortage problem.
Additionally, strengthen cooperation with international shipping institutions, actively participate in global shipping rule-making, especially in emerging areas like green shipping and digital shipping, to enhance Hong Kong’s voice in the global shipping landscape. Leverage the institutional advantage of “One Country, Two Systems” to deepen shipping cooperation with countries and regions along the “Belt and Road,” expand overseas market space, and build a more resilient global shipping network.
Conclusion
Persistent congestion indeed poses severe challenges to Hong Kong’s status as an international shipping center: cargo diversion, industry relocation, functional weakening, intensified competition. If these issues are not effectively resolved, they will gradually erode its core advantages. However, this does not mean Hong Kong’s position will be easily shaken. Core assets like the free port policy, global shipping network, and high-end professional services still exist. The “One Country, Two Systems” institutional advantage and the Greater Bay Area’s hinterland support provide it with vast development space.
The real risk lies not in the congestion itself but in indifference to it and a slow response. Historical experience shows that the status of the world’s top international shipping centers is not一成不变. Rotterdam Port regained vitality through digital twin technology, Singapore Port leads globally with full-process automation, and Dubai Port achieved leapfrog development with its “port + free zone” model. These cases prove that only through proactive change and continuous innovation can one maintain leadership in the global shipping landscape.
For Hong Kong, congestion is a crisis but also an opportunity for transformation. As long as it can use “efficiency reconstruction” to solve the congestion problem, use “functional upgrade” to重塑 its core competitiveness, use “synergy deepening” to integrate into the broader development of the Greater Bay Area, and use “ecosystem reshaping” to solidify the foundation for long-term development, it can transform the “pain point” of persistent congestion into a “highlight” of high-quality development. It can not only consolidate its status as the world’s fourth-largest international shipping center but also seize the initiative in emerging areas like green shipping, digital shipping, and high-end shipping services, becoming a “leader” in the transformational development of the global shipping industry. Conversely, if it continues with passive应对 and misses the transformation window, Hong Kong’s status as an international shipping center will be gradually diluted, ultimately reducing it from a “core hub” in the global shipping landscape to a “regional supporting actor.”